Keynote Speakers
Geoffroy de Clippel (Brown University, USA)
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Short Bio: Professor at Brown University, Professor de Clippel's research covers topics in mechanism design, behavioral economics, bargaining, distributive justice, cooperative games, and repeated games. Trained as a micro theorist, his research has expanded over the years to also incorporate the use of experimental economics to shed light on these problematics. Professor de Clippel currently serves as associate editor for the American Economic Review and Theoretical Economics, and has been the recipient over the years of multiple NSF grants.
Title of the keynote presentation: Caution in the Face of Complexity
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Coauthors: Paola Moscariello, Pietro Ortoleva, and Kareen Rozen
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Abstract: We show experimentally that people tend to substantially (15-20%) undervalue options they find complex, documenting this phenomenon for tasks as diverse as visual perception, belief updating, and the compounding of risk. This behavior is incompatible with expected utility, even when accounting for risk aversion and incorrect beliefs, but can be explained by ambiguity-averse people disliking the cognitive uncertainty they experience in the face of complexity. The data supports this explanation, as the effects co-vary with measures of cognitive uncertainty and ambiguity aversion. At a broad level, our work points that individual preferences (ambiguity attitudes) may matter in cognitive models of perceived complexity. At a narrower level, our paper informs the belief-formation literature (e.g., models of non-Bayesian updating), which overlook complexity aversion, and the connection between compound-lottery and ambiguity aversion, which, we show, holds only for subjects who find compound lotteries complex.
Gabrielle Demange (Paris School of Economics, France)
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Short Bio: Gabrielle Demange is Directeur de recherches at l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) and Professor at Paris School of Economics. Her research has concentrated on social choice theory (voting rules, ranking methods) game theory and its applications to market design (coalition formation, networks, multi-item auctions, allocation mechanisms) and financial economics (intergenerational risk sharing, intermediation and central counterparties). Her works on two-sided matching games and multi-item auctions with David Gale were among the first in a now large field.
She is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a fellow of the Game Theory Society and an Economic Theory Fellow. She is currently a Vice president of the Game Theory Society. She is a member of the Academia Europaea and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a recipient of the CNRS Silver medal.
Title of the keynote presentation: Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games
Abstract: In a cooperative game, coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units. Stable outcomes (in the core) are those blocked by no coalition. This paper has two objectives. First, building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, I unify and extend previous results on the existence of stable outcomes in simple games. Second, I review how and when the core approach applies in more general settings and may help to predict the stable splitting of a whole group into disjoint coalitions.
Edith Elkind (University of Oxford, UK)
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Short Bio: Edith Elkind is a Professor of Computer Science at the University of Oxford and the Theme lead on Game Theory at Alan Turing Institute. She obtained her PhD from Princeton in 2005, and has worked in the UK, Israel, and Singapore before joining Oxford in 2013. She works in algorithmic game theory, with a focus on algorithms for collective decision-making and coalition formation. Edith is an ELLIS Fellow, a EurAI Fellow, and a recipient of SIGAI Autonomous Agents Research Award (2023).
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Title of the keynote presentation: Deliberative Coalition Formation to Change the Status Quo
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Co-authors: Abheek Ghosh, Paul Goldberg, Davide Grossi, Udi Shapiro and Nimrod Talmon
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Abstract: We study a setting in which a community wishes to identify a strongly supported proposal from a space of alternatives, in order to change the status quo. We describe a deliberation process in which agents dynamically form coalitions around proposals that they prefer over the status quo. We formulate conditions on the space of proposals and on the ways in which coalitions are formed that guarantee deliberation to succeed, that is, to terminate by identifying a proposal with the largest possible support. Our results provide theoretical foundations for the analysis of deliberative processes, in particular in systems for democratic deliberation support, such as, for instance, Liquid Feedback or Polis.
Eilon Solan (Tel-Aviv University, Israel)
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Short Bio: Eilon Solan is the Nathan and Lily Silver Chair in Stochastic Models. He graduated from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1998, where he completed his PhD on stochastic games under the supervision of Abraham Neyman. After graduation, he joined the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. In 2000, he joined the School of Mathematical Sciences at Tel Aviv University. Together with Michael Maschler and Shmuel Zamir, Eilon Solan is the co-author of the textbook "Game Theory". He also authored the textbook "A Course in Stochastic Game Theory".
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Title of the keynote presentation: Stopping games with termination rates
Co-author: Catherine Rainer
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Abstract: Three-player stopping games in continuous-time need not admit epsilon-equilibria. To understand the reasons for this, we study multiplayer stopping games in continuous time, where stopping is not instantaneous. Rather, each player has a button, and decides at each time instance the intensity in which she presses the button. The instantaneous probability of termination depends on the intensities chosen by all players. We show that in this model, epsilon-equilibria do exist under general conditions, thereby explaining the nonexistence of epsilon-equilibria in standard multiplayer stopping games in continuous time.
